Drug Enforcement Administration

As indicated in The Drug Enforcement Administration 2016 Performance Budget Congressional Submission, the DEA supports The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) number one goal to “prevent terrorism and promote the nation’s security consistent with the rule of law.”[1] In reality, the organization focuses its efforts on the 2014 National Drug Control Strategy. In an attempt to measure the success of their efforts and determine if their strategy is working, the DEA employs a number of measurements to track projected and actual performance, including:

·      The number of disrupted and dismantled drug organizations

·      Monetary value of currency, property, and drugs seized (drug trafficker revenue denied)

·      Number of international students trained

Data from 2014 will be the focus of the analysis, but I evaluate data from 2010-2013 in order to grasp an understanding of the occurring trends.

With finite resources, the DEA has to carefully allocate resources for pursuing its mission of disrupting and dismantling the world’s “Most Wanted” drug traffickers. Are the indicators that the DEA employs to measure its performance appropriate? Do these indicators suggest that they are reaching their targets and equally as important, do their targets correctly correlate with their objectives? The results of the assessment have national security implications because if the indicators are flawed, how can the DEA know if the policy is working?

The DEA

An organization’s mission incorporates its interests as well as its objective.[2] The mission provides focus and captures the essence (how the organization ideally sees its self) of the organization. Simply put, the essence of the DEA is seizing drugs and shutting down drug cartels. The DEA focuses on both enforcing regulations domestically and assisting foreign counterparts to reduce the availability of illicit drugs on the international market.  The mission of the DEA states that they aim to “enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and bring offenders before the criminal and civil justice system of the United States.” [3]

Their strategy to accomplish such lofty goals are outlined in the 2014 National Drug Control Strategy, including: disrupting domestic drug trafficking and production, strengthening international partnerships, improving information systems for analysis, assessment, and local management.[4] The DEA focuses its disrupting and dismantling efforts on identified Priority Target Organizations (PTO), interdiction of contraband, and training international counterparts. The DEA lacks authority to investigate unilaterally overseas, so it depends on host nation law enforcement cooperation.

The Role of Indicators

Indicators are not the same thing as quantitative goals[5] and should not be seen as a benchmark. Similar to quantitative goals, indicators are quantitative and measurable, but also have a directional component, which ideally captures performance as the indicator increases or decreases. Additionally, indicators are time-based. This allows decision maker not only to identify trends, but also see the rate of change of an indicators.[6] Indicators, in theory, are used to see if the strategy is accomplishing the mission. 

Analysis of Indicators used by The DEA

In 2014, the DEA disrupted 211 and dismantled 96 Priority Target Organizations (PTOs), confiscated $3.9 billion worth of drug revenue and trained 3,937 international students. These figures represent the dominant indicators for the DEA. However, these numbers on their own do little to inform decision makers if their strategies are working and if the strategy employed is accomplishing the mission.  First, we must get a better understanding of performance by seeing if these indicators increased or decreased from the previous year and at what rate of change. Secondly, we must analysis if the indicators selected are able to appropriately assess the DEA strategy.

We see the upward trend of the DEA’s indicators from 2010 to 2015. The amount of organizations disrupted and dismantled in 2010 is an outlier in that it is unusually large. Also, the value of the revenue that was denied is unavailable for 2010. Using OxMetrics, I scaled the graph to the indicators' means and ranges.  From 2011 to 2012 all of the indicators increased. More interestingly, from 2012 to 2013 the indicators continued to increase, but did so at faster rate.

I find that the DEA is using the most appropriate indicators for their overall mission and in their dominant indicator set they capture two of the three components of their strategy. The first two measurements, the number of disrupted and dismantled organizations and drug revenue denied, are in sync with the strategy to “disrupt domestic drug trafficking and production.” The measurement of international students trained captures the DEA effectiveness of their 2014 National Drug Control Strategy to “strengthen international partnerships.”[7] However, the third component of the 2014 Drug Control Strategy, to “improve information systems for analysis, assessment, and local management” was completely omitted in the set of dominant indicators.

Despite this omission, the organization employed the best indicators available. I reason that they are in fact utilizing the best indicators because, in an environment where so much is happening, they are able to capture some portion of what is actually going on. The supply of drugs is influenced by a wide array of noise, but the DEA's indicators are able, in part, to distinguish a significant amount of signal, which is the impact and effectiveness of the chosen strategy.[8] Ultimately, the indicators are useful because as they vary, the chosen strategy can be assessed. From the indicators, the figures suggest that the strategy of the DEA is working and they are on track to accomplish their mission.

Conclusion

Besides concentrating on the 2014 National Drug Control Strategy, in an attempt to stay relevant, the DEA nested its strategy with that of their parent organization, The Department of Justice, in hopes of procuring part of the counterterrorism funding. The DOJ’s strategic objective 1.1 is to “prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur by integrating intelligence and law enforcement efforts to achieve a coordinated response to terrorist threats.”[9] While the DEA is part of the US Intelligence Community and is a law enforcement agency, the emphasis on preventing terrorists attacks is absent from the DEA's mission, strategy, and indicators.

The indicators used to judge if the strategy is working are significantly influenced by the essence and desired prestige of the organization, but this serves the organization by drawing them back to their mission. The chosen indicators, as a vehicle to judge the progression of the strategy, are adequate and insightful. The national security implications of this essay suggest that the three performance indicators focus the mission of the DEA and make the US safer through choking the supply of drugs that make it into the US.  However, I question the DEA’s ability to monitor the progress of the chosen strategy effectiveness in preventing terrorism.

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[1] U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration (2016). Performance Budget Congressional Submission. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

[2] Gartner, Scott Sigmund. Strategic Assessment in War. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997. 45.

[3] "Mission Statement." DEA.gov. Accessed April 7, 2015. http://www.dea.gov/about/mission.shtml.

[4] DEA, FY 2016 Performance Budget Congressional Submission, 4.

[5] Gartner, 44.

[6] Gartner, 52.

[7] United States. Office of National Drug Control Policy. National Drug Control Strategy. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2014. Print.

[8] Gartner, 47.

[9] DEA, FY 2016 Performance Budget Congressional Submission, 4.

Romney 2016? Why we will never know...

Could Mitt Romney, the 2012 Republican nominee, win the presidency in 2016? We will never know. After briefly contemplating the notion of running for president, Mitt Romney decided that it was not worth it. In this essay, I will address how he came to that decision and what indicators he used in making his decision. Using the framework found in Gartner’s Strategic Assessment In War,[1] I will look at how Governor Romney made decisions using the information that he had, specifically the three weeks he contemplated running.

After indicating that he would not run again after losing the 2012 presidential election, early in 2015 he expressed his interest in running. In the short time frame that he was contemplating a campaign, the USA today reported that he was leading Republican competitors Jeb Bush and Ben Carson in early polls.[2] Despite leading in polls and learning of the public support for him by fellow Republicans, he announced that he would no longer consider running and felt that it was in the best interest to let someone else run.    

Gartner’s Strategic Assessment In War employs a diagram knows as “The State of Nature Game Tree.”  In the diagram, nature has placed the actor in either a position of “W” or “L.” If at position “W” decision ‘A’ results in a victory and decision ‘B’ results in a defeat and vice versa for position “L.” The catch being that the actor is unaware of his or her location. He or she must use indicators to draw conclusions of their current position. Indicators can update the actor’s assumptions of his or her positioning.

Mitt Romney’s decision was influenced by the three-week period he contemplated running. This short time period was how he updated his assumption of where he was at on “The State of Nature Game Tree.” Those three weeks were a taste of the burden/political toll of what another presidential campaign would include. He was able to update his assumed positioned by seeing that the indicator burden was too high and he was better off not running.             

It was assumed that Governor Romney was testing the waters to see if there was support for him to pursue the presidency. That apparently was not the reason because, despite leading, he still backed out. Others claimed he backed out because some of the donors from the Republican base were expected to fund fellow Republican Jeb Bush. This fails to adequately explain his decision because he could self-fund if needed. If the indicator that he was going off of was potential support (which he found) and financial means (which he has), the rational choice would have been to purse the nomination. Instead, I claim not running was a strategic decision based on the indicator I label as burden and the political toll of winning the nomination.

I suggest that after three weeks of investigating if the support was there (which he found out it was), it was enough time to realize the burden of a fierce drawn out campaign would prove too much; it would be too costly to get the nomination. After suffering such political costs, he would be less likely to defeat the probable Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton. The cost would be too much; not the economic costs, but the toll of suffering through a twenty-month campaign with almost as many candidates as months until Election Day.   

The dominant indicator for Mitt Romney’s decision not to run for president was not support or financing, but burden. He also realized that if he were to gain the nomination it would be such a difficult, costly fight, his image would not be equipped to take on a politically fresh Hillary Clinton who is anticipated as going unchallenged on her path to the Democratic nomination. The dominant indicator approach, burden, helps us explain his decision not to run, which is outlined by the red arrows in the diagram below. It is fascinating to study decision making because choices have to be made today that will effect tomorrow, but as you are trying to make decision today, you not only do not know about tomorrow, you are unclear where you are today. This is where indicators are useful, but they are a simplification and you are unaware if the given indicator is accurately capturing reality.

[1] Gartner, Scott Sigmund. Strategic Assessment in War. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997.

[2] Camia, Catalina. "Mitt Romney Decides against 2016 Presidential Race." USA Today. January 30, 2015. Accessed April 2, 2015.