Mutually Assured
Destruction and Bargaining Theory
By Matthew W. Brown
March 14, 2015
Is mutually assured
destruction (MAD) as relevant and as effective today as it was the 1950s? As
Iran grabs headlines as it tries to become the 10
th nuclear-armed
state, will the policies and practices of yesterday keep us safe today?
The older, established powers consolidate
their nuclear weapons arsenal while emerging market countries such as India and
China are “quantitatively and qualitatively increasing their arsenals and
deploying weapons at more sites.”
Both India and China have had relative political stability for the past 50
years with limited volatility in their respective democratic and authoritarian
regimes. Pakistan, who most recently inserted itself into the nuclear-armed
country club, has been plagued with military coups and shifts in the political
landscape. The costs that a nuclear weapon inflict are so great that the
bargaining range is sufficiently large so all actors involved are able to find
a solution, short of using a nuclear weapon, and still be better off. While
this has been the general consensus, will instability-in the case of Pakistan-
and acquisition-in the case of Iran- revive the importance of the cold war
principle: nuclear deterrence?
Since1939, when
the Albert Einstein first warned President Franklin D. Roosevelt that work to
harness nuclear energy was being conducted in Berlin; the military application
was explored by the United States.
After the first two atomic bombs (that only used fission energy) led to Japan’s
surrender in 1945, the United States’ monopoly on the weapon system expired in 1949
when Russia began testing nuclear capabilities. As nuclear technology advanced,
thermonuclear bombs (using fusion) were found to have a thousand-fold-plus
yield.
With both rivals having nuclear weapons, even though they had relatively low nuclear
yields, each country sought to have sufficient ame ounts of weapons that they
could retaliate in case they were attacked first.
The effects of
nuclear weapons are so great that if used, disaster ensues. Pound per pound, a
nuclear bomb is millions of times more powerful than a conventional bomb.
Despite the catastrophic explosion, some of
the other effects are an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), a blast wave, and
radiation. Radiation can be released over an extended time frame in the form of
the fallout. The fallout is the precipitation to Earth of radioactive particulate
matter from a nuclear cloud.
The EMP caused by a nuclear explosion damages electrical systems. The blast
wave causes casualties far from the explosion site and can even destroy
underground structures.
The net result of
all these effects is essentially the debilitation and destruction of the
targeted area. By having enough weapons to retaliate, the cumulative result is
MAD. As stated by Gartner, “each state could absorb a nuclear first-strike
attack and respond with a nuclear attack producing such catastrophic level of
assured destruction that neither side could view the outcome as a victory,”
thus MAD served as deterrence.
Bargaining theory
looks at the decision to enter a conflict from a cost vs. benefits approach.
Because war is costly, in both blood and treasure, there exists a bargaining
range; a range where both actors benefit from coming to an agreement rather
than paying for the costs of war. The costs of war negate some of the gross
benefit of achieving the result of the war, causing a smaller net benefit.
Despite this range where compromises can be made, where both actors are better
off, there is still conflict. The three reasons that there are still conflicts
are: incomplete information, advantages of attacking first, and indivisible
issues.
Bargaining theory
explains the rational for MAD. Maintaining the status quo is the most
attractive option because the costs inflicted by nuclear weapons are simply too
high. The benefit of striking first is negated by the ability of the enemy to
impose heavy costs through retaliation. Bargaining theory assumes the actor is
rational. Will MAD still hold nuclear-armed actors at bay? Looking at Pakistan
and their hatred and rivalry with India, it would suggest that they are
anything but rational. However, I assert that MAD continues to be a valid deterrent
with both legitimate states, ‘rogue’ states and even if a terrorist
organization obtained nuclear capabilities. Despite the tactics of targeting
civilians and the use of suicide bombings, any groups’ objective is survival
and therefore MAD remains relevant.
