Drug Enforcement Administration

As indicated in The Drug Enforcement Administration 2016 Performance Budget Congressional Submission, the DEA supports The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) number one goal to “prevent terrorism and promote the nation’s security consistent with the rule of law.”[1] In reality, the organization focuses its efforts on the 2014 National Drug Control Strategy. In an attempt to measure the success of their efforts and determine if their strategy is working, the DEA employs a number of measurements to track projected and actual performance, including:

·      The number of disrupted and dismantled drug organizations

·      Monetary value of currency, property, and drugs seized (drug trafficker revenue denied)

·      Number of international students trained

Data from 2014 will be the focus of the analysis, but I evaluate data from 2010-2013 in order to grasp an understanding of the occurring trends.

With finite resources, the DEA has to carefully allocate resources for pursuing its mission of disrupting and dismantling the world’s “Most Wanted” drug traffickers. Are the indicators that the DEA employs to measure its performance appropriate? Do these indicators suggest that they are reaching their targets and equally as important, do their targets correctly correlate with their objectives? The results of the assessment have national security implications because if the indicators are flawed, how can the DEA know if the policy is working?

The DEA

An organization’s mission incorporates its interests as well as its objective.[2] The mission provides focus and captures the essence (how the organization ideally sees its self) of the organization. Simply put, the essence of the DEA is seizing drugs and shutting down drug cartels. The DEA focuses on both enforcing regulations domestically and assisting foreign counterparts to reduce the availability of illicit drugs on the international market.  The mission of the DEA states that they aim to “enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and bring offenders before the criminal and civil justice system of the United States.” [3]

Their strategy to accomplish such lofty goals are outlined in the 2014 National Drug Control Strategy, including: disrupting domestic drug trafficking and production, strengthening international partnerships, improving information systems for analysis, assessment, and local management.[4] The DEA focuses its disrupting and dismantling efforts on identified Priority Target Organizations (PTO), interdiction of contraband, and training international counterparts. The DEA lacks authority to investigate unilaterally overseas, so it depends on host nation law enforcement cooperation.

The Role of Indicators

Indicators are not the same thing as quantitative goals[5] and should not be seen as a benchmark. Similar to quantitative goals, indicators are quantitative and measurable, but also have a directional component, which ideally captures performance as the indicator increases or decreases. Additionally, indicators are time-based. This allows decision maker not only to identify trends, but also see the rate of change of an indicators.[6] Indicators, in theory, are used to see if the strategy is accomplishing the mission. 

Analysis of Indicators used by The DEA

In 2014, the DEA disrupted 211 and dismantled 96 Priority Target Organizations (PTOs), confiscated $3.9 billion worth of drug revenue and trained 3,937 international students. These figures represent the dominant indicators for the DEA. However, these numbers on their own do little to inform decision makers if their strategies are working and if the strategy employed is accomplishing the mission.  First, we must get a better understanding of performance by seeing if these indicators increased or decreased from the previous year and at what rate of change. Secondly, we must analysis if the indicators selected are able to appropriately assess the DEA strategy.

We see the upward trend of the DEA’s indicators from 2010 to 2015. The amount of organizations disrupted and dismantled in 2010 is an outlier in that it is unusually large. Also, the value of the revenue that was denied is unavailable for 2010. Using OxMetrics, I scaled the graph to the indicators' means and ranges.  From 2011 to 2012 all of the indicators increased. More interestingly, from 2012 to 2013 the indicators continued to increase, but did so at faster rate.

I find that the DEA is using the most appropriate indicators for their overall mission and in their dominant indicator set they capture two of the three components of their strategy. The first two measurements, the number of disrupted and dismantled organizations and drug revenue denied, are in sync with the strategy to “disrupt domestic drug trafficking and production.” The measurement of international students trained captures the DEA effectiveness of their 2014 National Drug Control Strategy to “strengthen international partnerships.”[7] However, the third component of the 2014 Drug Control Strategy, to “improve information systems for analysis, assessment, and local management” was completely omitted in the set of dominant indicators.

Despite this omission, the organization employed the best indicators available. I reason that they are in fact utilizing the best indicators because, in an environment where so much is happening, they are able to capture some portion of what is actually going on. The supply of drugs is influenced by a wide array of noise, but the DEA's indicators are able, in part, to distinguish a significant amount of signal, which is the impact and effectiveness of the chosen strategy.[8] Ultimately, the indicators are useful because as they vary, the chosen strategy can be assessed. From the indicators, the figures suggest that the strategy of the DEA is working and they are on track to accomplish their mission.

Conclusion

Besides concentrating on the 2014 National Drug Control Strategy, in an attempt to stay relevant, the DEA nested its strategy with that of their parent organization, The Department of Justice, in hopes of procuring part of the counterterrorism funding. The DOJ’s strategic objective 1.1 is to “prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur by integrating intelligence and law enforcement efforts to achieve a coordinated response to terrorist threats.”[9] While the DEA is part of the US Intelligence Community and is a law enforcement agency, the emphasis on preventing terrorists attacks is absent from the DEA's mission, strategy, and indicators.

The indicators used to judge if the strategy is working are significantly influenced by the essence and desired prestige of the organization, but this serves the organization by drawing them back to their mission. The chosen indicators, as a vehicle to judge the progression of the strategy, are adequate and insightful. The national security implications of this essay suggest that the three performance indicators focus the mission of the DEA and make the US safer through choking the supply of drugs that make it into the US.  However, I question the DEA’s ability to monitor the progress of the chosen strategy effectiveness in preventing terrorism.

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[1] U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration (2016). Performance Budget Congressional Submission. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

[2] Gartner, Scott Sigmund. Strategic Assessment in War. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997. 45.

[3] "Mission Statement." DEA.gov. Accessed April 7, 2015. http://www.dea.gov/about/mission.shtml.

[4] DEA, FY 2016 Performance Budget Congressional Submission, 4.

[5] Gartner, 44.

[6] Gartner, 52.

[7] United States. Office of National Drug Control Policy. National Drug Control Strategy. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2014. Print.

[8] Gartner, 47.

[9] DEA, FY 2016 Performance Budget Congressional Submission, 4.

Romney 2016? Why we will never know...

Could Mitt Romney, the 2012 Republican nominee, win the presidency in 2016? We will never know. After briefly contemplating the notion of running for president, Mitt Romney decided that it was not worth it. In this essay, I will address how he came to that decision and what indicators he used in making his decision. Using the framework found in Gartner’s Strategic Assessment In War,[1] I will look at how Governor Romney made decisions using the information that he had, specifically the three weeks he contemplated running.

After indicating that he would not run again after losing the 2012 presidential election, early in 2015 he expressed his interest in running. In the short time frame that he was contemplating a campaign, the USA today reported that he was leading Republican competitors Jeb Bush and Ben Carson in early polls.[2] Despite leading in polls and learning of the public support for him by fellow Republicans, he announced that he would no longer consider running and felt that it was in the best interest to let someone else run.    

Gartner’s Strategic Assessment In War employs a diagram knows as “The State of Nature Game Tree.”  In the diagram, nature has placed the actor in either a position of “W” or “L.” If at position “W” decision ‘A’ results in a victory and decision ‘B’ results in a defeat and vice versa for position “L.” The catch being that the actor is unaware of his or her location. He or she must use indicators to draw conclusions of their current position. Indicators can update the actor’s assumptions of his or her positioning.

Mitt Romney’s decision was influenced by the three-week period he contemplated running. This short time period was how he updated his assumption of where he was at on “The State of Nature Game Tree.” Those three weeks were a taste of the burden/political toll of what another presidential campaign would include. He was able to update his assumed positioned by seeing that the indicator burden was too high and he was better off not running.             

It was assumed that Governor Romney was testing the waters to see if there was support for him to pursue the presidency. That apparently was not the reason because, despite leading, he still backed out. Others claimed he backed out because some of the donors from the Republican base were expected to fund fellow Republican Jeb Bush. This fails to adequately explain his decision because he could self-fund if needed. If the indicator that he was going off of was potential support (which he found) and financial means (which he has), the rational choice would have been to purse the nomination. Instead, I claim not running was a strategic decision based on the indicator I label as burden and the political toll of winning the nomination.

I suggest that after three weeks of investigating if the support was there (which he found out it was), it was enough time to realize the burden of a fierce drawn out campaign would prove too much; it would be too costly to get the nomination. After suffering such political costs, he would be less likely to defeat the probable Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton. The cost would be too much; not the economic costs, but the toll of suffering through a twenty-month campaign with almost as many candidates as months until Election Day.   

The dominant indicator for Mitt Romney’s decision not to run for president was not support or financing, but burden. He also realized that if he were to gain the nomination it would be such a difficult, costly fight, his image would not be equipped to take on a politically fresh Hillary Clinton who is anticipated as going unchallenged on her path to the Democratic nomination. The dominant indicator approach, burden, helps us explain his decision not to run, which is outlined by the red arrows in the diagram below. It is fascinating to study decision making because choices have to be made today that will effect tomorrow, but as you are trying to make decision today, you not only do not know about tomorrow, you are unclear where you are today. This is where indicators are useful, but they are a simplification and you are unaware if the given indicator is accurately capturing reality.

[1] Gartner, Scott Sigmund. Strategic Assessment in War. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997.

[2] Camia, Catalina. "Mitt Romney Decides against 2016 Presidential Race." USA Today. January 30, 2015. Accessed April 2, 2015.

The Warrior Ethos

Reflection on how Army ROTC enabled me to accomplish my dream: 

Winning the NCAA National Champion in Wrestling

After suffering a loss in the Big Ten Conference finals, I resolved to uphold the third component of the warrior ethos –I will never quit. Going into the NCAA Championship my senior year I was prepared to never quit, regardless of the position I found myself. In both my quarterfinals and semifinals matches, I had to defend my opponent’s attack with only seconds remaining. If I would have given up a late takedown in either match, I would have lost, but my resolve to live the warrior ethos enabled me to pull out the victory.

The lessons I have extrapolated from ROTC and applied elsewhere are many. In particular, I applied the concept of  ‘train as you fight’ as I wore a singlet (a competition wrestling uniform) during practice to help me get over the nervous of wrestling in a singlet in front of a sold out Rec Hall. From early morning staff meetings, the glaring lesson was if you want to succeed, preparation is paramount.

Losing by a point with only 20 seconds left in the NCAA finals, the warrior ethos once again returned in significance. This time I had to live “I will never accept defeat.” I gave my best effort and forced 2 technical violations to come from behind and win. The crazy, bizarre finish was anticlimactic, but was set in motion because with short time remaining I was unwilling to accept defeat.

Obviously, the lessons learned in ROTC have far weightier consequences than their application in a sporting event. We have been preparing to lead in the United States Army, what a calling. While it has been difficult to balance the many responsibilities during my college career, I have always been proud to attend ROTC functions. Whether it is waking up at 0500 for a urine analysis test, an APFT or being CiC for an event, it does not matter. Wearing the uniform and being able to represent the country is something special, an opportunity for which I am very grateful.

I have loved my time in the Nittany Lion Battalion –PENN STATE PROUD!

Mutually Assured Destruction and Bargaining Theory by Matthew W. Brown

Mutually Assured Destruction and Bargaining Theory

By Matthew W. Brown

 March 14, 2015

Is mutually assured destruction (MAD) as relevant and as effective today as it was the 1950s? As Iran grabs headlines as it tries to become the 10^th nuclear-armed state, will the policies and practices of yesterday keep us safe today?  The older, established powers consolidate their nuclear weapons arsenal while emerging market countries such as India and China are “quantitatively and qualitatively increasing their arsenals and deploying weapons at more sites.”[1] Both India and China have had relative political stability for the past 50 years with limited volatility in their respective democratic and authoritarian regimes. Pakistan, who most recently inserted itself into the nuclear-armed country club, has been plagued with military coups and shifts in the political landscape. The costs that a nuclear weapon inflict are so great that the bargaining range is sufficiently large so all actors involved are able to find a solution, short of using a nuclear weapon, and still be better off. While this has been the general consensus, will instability-in the case of Pakistan- and acquisition-in the case of Iran- revive the importance of the cold war principle: nuclear deterrence?

Since1939, when the Albert Einstein first warned President Franklin D. Roosevelt that work to harness nuclear energy was being conducted in Berlin; the military application was explored by the United States.[2] After the first two atomic bombs (that only used fission energy) led to Japan’s surrender in 1945, the United States’ monopoly on the weapon system expired in 1949 when Russia began testing nuclear capabilities. As nuclear technology advanced, thermonuclear bombs (using fusion) were found to have a thousand-fold-plus yield.[3] With both rivals having nuclear weapons, even though they had relatively low nuclear yields, each country sought to have sufficient ame ounts of weapons that they could retaliate in case they were attacked first.

The effects of nuclear weapons are so great that if used, disaster ensues. Pound per pound, a nuclear bomb is millions of times more powerful than a conventional bomb.[4]  Despite the catastrophic explosion, some of the other effects are an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), a blast wave, and radiation. Radiation can be released over an extended time frame in the form of the fallout. The fallout is the precipitation to Earth of radioactive particulate matter from a nuclear cloud.[5] The EMP caused by a nuclear explosion damages electrical systems. The blast wave causes casualties far from the explosion site and can even destroy underground structures.[6]

The net result of all these effects is essentially the debilitation and destruction of the targeted area. By having enough weapons to retaliate, the cumulative result is MAD. As stated by Gartner, “each state could absorb a nuclear first-strike attack and respond with a nuclear attack producing such catastrophic level of assured destruction that neither side could view the outcome as a victory,”[7] thus MAD served as deterrence.        

Bargaining theory looks at the decision to enter a conflict from a cost vs. benefits approach.[8] Because war is costly, in both blood and treasure, there exists a bargaining range; a range where both actors benefit from coming to an agreement rather than paying for the costs of war. The costs of war negate some of the gross benefit of achieving the result of the war, causing a smaller net benefit. Despite this range where compromises can be made, where both actors are better off, there is still conflict. The three reasons that there are still conflicts are: incomplete information, advantages of attacking first, and indivisible issues.

Bargaining theory explains the rational for MAD. Maintaining the status quo is the most attractive option because the costs inflicted by nuclear weapons are simply too high. The benefit of striking first is negated by the ability of the enemy to impose heavy costs through retaliation. Bargaining theory assumes the actor is rational. Will MAD still hold nuclear-armed actors at bay? Looking at Pakistan and their hatred and rivalry with India, it would suggest that they are anything but rational. However, I assert that MAD continues to be a valid deterrent with both legitimate states, ‘rogue’ states and even if a terrorist organization obtained nuclear capabilities. Despite the tactics of targeting civilians and the use of suicide bombings, any groups’ objective is survival and therefore MAD remains relevant.

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[1]Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Nuclear Notebook: Worldwide

deployments of nuclear weapons, 2009’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists November/December (2009) pp.86-98.

[2] Nuclear Matters: A Practical Guide

[3] Henry D. Sokolski, ‘Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its origins and Practice’, November (2004)

[4] Practical Guide, Appendix B.

[5] Practical Guide, Appendix H

[6] Practical Guide, Appendix B

[7] Scott Sigmund Gartner, ‘All Mistakes Are Not Equal: Intelligence Errors and National Security’, Intelligence and National Security (2012) p. 19

[8] Powell, Robert. "Bargaining Theory And International Conflict." Annual Review Of Political Science 5, no. 1 (June 2002)